Over the last quarter century, scholars have come to view the rule of law as a solution to crucial substantive problems in the social sciences. Elements of the rule of law are afforded great causal weight in theoretical models of economic development and growth (Barro 1997) , state capacity (North and Weingast 1989; Stasavage 2002) , the protection of human rights (Apodaca 2004; Cross 1999; Keith 2002) and even political and social order (North and Weingast 1989; North, Summerhill and Weingast 2000) .
Building the rule of law has become a goal of non-governmental organizations, major state powers and international institutions of all types (e.g. Carothers 2006) . It is perhaps little exaggeration to say that the rule of law has become a sort of mantra for those interested in promoting human welfare via institutional design. Reflecting its conceptual importance, the number of rule of law measures has increased tremendously in recent years. Haggard et al (2008) report on seven measures and we add six to total thirteen in this paper. Clearly, we do not want for data. In principle, as we accumulate more and more information, we find ourselves in a better position to test theoretical claims about the rule of law and to track legal reform. In practice, however, we lack a good sense of which of the numerous available measures are appropriate in particular research projects. Which of these measures reflect well the theoretical concept of interest?
Unfortunately, scholars have expressed serious concerns about measurement validity. Haggard et al (2008) note that existing measures are not necessarily well related to each other (some negatively so), and this is true even when we evaluate only measures that were designed to tap into the same conceptual feature of the rule of law (e.g. security of contract). In addition, there is also a significant problem of data availability. Whereas the Political Risk Service's (PRS) measure is available for a long time series, the World Bank's measure only dates back to the mid-1990s and many other measures are available crosssectionally only (e.g. Feld and Voigt 2003; La Porta et al 2004) . Scholars also have raised concerns about the varied, potentially unreliable, and likely biased processes by which the measures are generated. Most directly, subjective measures of the rule of law (be they derived from surveys of firms, entrepreneurs, experts, or citizens) have prompted some critics to ask whether the measures are biased towards the interests of the surveyed: "Because international experts often tended to be businessmen, theirs was a one-sided view and measure. Singapore, for example, ranks at the top of many ratings" (Hammergren 2006, 14) .
Although these features of the measurement landscape are easily demonstrated and suggest reasonable concerns, they obscure the central problem of evaluating the validity of rule of law measures, which is simple, and frankly, well known (Haggard et al 2008) . Scholars do not share a definition of the rule of law. It is an "essentially contested concept" (Waldron 2002) . With its aggregate indicator, the World Bank seeks to capture "the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence" (World Bank 2007, 3) . The Fraser Institute attempts to measure the "protection of persons and their rightfully acquired property," and the PRS produces a single index that supposedly reflects the strength and impartiality of the legal system and popular observance of law. Judging that is unaffected by extra-legal concerns? Good contract enforcement? Does it imply all of these things? If so, do some of them matter more than others, and if so, in what ways exactly? In so far as measurement validity claims are always tied intimately to the concepts the indicators supposedly reflect, this problem could not be any more pressing.
Fortunately, scholars are aware of this problem; however, it is at this point that we typically proceed without addressing them directly. We either note key conceptual differences across measures and then evaluate measurement validity, the differences notwithstanding (e.g. Skanning 2008 ); or, we note the differences and then suggest that further research is required into the processes by which distinct strands of the rule of law are related to one another (e.g. Haggard et al 2008) . In this paper, we wish to advance a different approach. We wish to offer three simple, practical suggestions about how to pick and subsequently analyze rule of law measures.
First, at the risk of taking a position on concepts, which we generally view as unassailable, the rule of law concept in its broadest sense is simply too big for the vast majority of research projects. As we discuss below, those that invoke the broad concept of the rule of law typically have in mind at least three dimensions: 1) an institutional dimension that captures the extent to which government can be constrained by other elements of the state, 2) an individual dimension that captures the extent to which individuals are treated fairly by the legal system, and 3) a social dimension that captures political order and social stability. And what's more, each dimension contains a number of distinct components (e.g. judicial or bureaucratic independence, access to courts, procedural due process, etc.). There are many reasons to caution against such a broad concept, but we wish to stress that it is unhelpful for two reasons. It makes it difficult to learn precisely what about the rule of law matters and what does not. In addition, the concept includes distinct subcomponents that common social scientific theories view as causally related (e.g. government constraint is a cause of social order and judicial impartiality is a cause of judicial trust).
These are theoretical claims, which require testing but which are true by definition under a broad rule of law concept. That said, we believe that it is of course reasonable and highly useful to develop stand-alone measures of the components captured under the rule of law concept. In this paper, we will focus on the first dimension. In particular, we will seek to evaluate the validity of measures of judicial independence, a central component of the first dimension, and one that plays an important theoretical role in numerous literatures. Far from the gloomy picture suggested by the lack of tight correlations across measures described by Haggard et al, we suggest cautious optimism for judicial independence measures. Second, we absolutely must let our concepts and existing theory about these concepts guide our measurement choices. Collier and Adcock (1999, 539) argue that "specific methodological choices are often best understood and justified in light of the theoretical framework, analytic goals, and context of research involved in any particular study." We could not agree more. Scholars are no doubt familiar with common distinctions between de jure and de facto judicial independence, but there are important differences between different concepts of de facto independence, as well; and these differences matter greatly for what you wish to measure. What is more, we have good theory and evidence that judicial behavior is strategic, and for that reason, we might like a measure that is robust to the observable effects of judicial strategy (e.g. Epstien and Knight 1998; Helmke 2005; Murphy 1964; Vanberg 2005) . We hope to suggest a few ways by which this might be done.
The third implication involves data availability. Although it is clear that data availability varies wildly across measures, what is less well understood is that the missing data problem is broader and more consequential than that measures simply return no information on some states in some years. Even within a block of years for which measures produce values, missingness patterns are non-random, which implies an important challenge to inference that empirical researchers really should not ignore. We present simple evidence of non-random missingness for twelve of the thirteen measures we evaluate below, and we have no reason to believe that our thirteenth measure is necessarily immune to the problem. Fortunately, there are statistical corrections for the inferential biases that emerge when we fail to take account of nonrandom missingness. For this reason, scholars that use these data ought to be particularly concerned about the process by which they deal with missing data. 3 We divide the remainder of the paper into two substantive sections and a conclusion. We first address the broad rule of law concept and then turn to an evaluation of judicial independence. We conclude with some implications of our main points.
II. The Rule of Law Concept
We lack a standard definition of the rule of law. (Raz 1977, 198 . See also Macedo 1994, 148) . Even though there is a list of requisites, it is not clear how the elements in the list relate to each other, which ones may be necessary conditions for others, or if a subset of the elements (or a certain amount of all of them) is sufficient to consider that law rules in a given country.
While there is no consensus on what the rule of law is, there seems to be agreement on what the rule of law stands against. As Judith Shklar put it, three negative elements can lead to a better understanding of an otherwise obscure concept of the "rule of law": "the insecurity of arbitrary government, the discriminations of injustice, and the fear of violence" (Shklar 1998, 37) . These elements suggest three dimensions that are part of the rule of law: an institutional dimension linked to the contention of governmental arbitrariness, an individual dimension linked to the prevention or correction of discriminatory practices in law enforcement, and a social dimension related to instability and violence.
For many theorists, the institutional dimension is of crucial importance. As Macedo (1994, 149) writes, "[M]ore than anything else, the rule of law stands against arbitrariness and caprice: it regularizes political power and renders it impersonal." It is also within this dimension where we have a strong tradition of theoretical and practical arguments that have been used in the design of institutions. In classic institutional theory, dividing the state into concurrent and mutually dependent powers has been thought crucial to precluding arbitrariness and promoting liberty (Montesquieu 1997; Locke 1998; Madison et al 1961) . Within the institutional dimension, the judicial component has been considered paramount historically (e.g. Montesquieu 1787, Book II); and, modern institutional research suggests that independent judiciaries that constrain arbitrary state power ensure that state promises to respect individual rights are perceived credible (e.g. North 1990 ). This credibility breeds efficient investment and growth (e.g. Frye 2004). Researchers also have suggested that well-functioning legal systems are critical to the protection of human rights (Cross 1998; Keith 2002 ).
An institutional structure that prevents arbitrariness, however, does not exhaust the concept of rule of law. The individual dimension relative to discrimination in law enforcement is also of central importance. As Montesquieu warned us: "it is not sufficient to [examine] political liberty as relative to the constitution; we must examine it likewise in the relation it bears to the subject", because "the constitution may happen to be free, and the subject not" and vice versa (1997, Book XII, 216) . And the "political liberty of the subject … consists in security, or in the opinion people have of their security", and this security "is never more dangerously attacked than in public or private accusations" (1997, Book XII, 217 Thus, in its most general sense, the rule of law involves three dimensions, within which fall distinct and varied components. Table 1 summarizes this structure.
[ Table 1 ]
Given the breadth of this concept, it is not surprising that attempts to measure it throw as wide a net as possible. The most obvious example of this approach is the World Bank's Rule of Law measure, which aggregates survey questions that tap into components as distinct as access to land and access to water for agriculture, the pervasiveness of money laundering through banks, confidence in the police and the neutrality of the judges, and violent and organized crime (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007b, 74 (2000, 14) . A minimalist or procedural conception of democracy allows the researcher to empirically assess whether core elements of democracy process actually produce equality, development or human satisfaction. Substantive conceptions simply assert that such relationships exist (Dahl 1971; Przeworski et al 2000, 14) .
We believe that the same problem infects the rule of law. We might like to advance social order and we have theory suggesting that good legal institutions designed to constrain government can help do so (North, Summerhill and Weingast 2000) . How can we know if this theory is wrong if we insist on lumping together distinct pieces of a causal process into one measure? We believe that abandoning the multidimensional rule of law concept and focusing on its dimensions or on components within each dimension will lead to more fruitful empirical research. Thus, the big questions over whether the rule of law generates economic development, human rights protection, or corruption control can be more fruitfully explored if broken down into the dimensions of rule of law. Does judicial independence protect human rights or advance development? Does social trust in the impartiality of judicial officers reduce
corruption? Under what conditions does protecting property rights produce higher levels of investment?
These are the questions we should be asking. We should use measures designed to let us answer them.
This line of argument suggests a simple implication for our efforts to evaluate the validity of rule of law measures. We ought to limit the exercise to particular dimensions, and better still, to components within those dimensions. By doing so, we give ourselves the best chance to link a measure to a coherent and empirically useful concept. In the remainder of this paper, we focus on the concept of judicial independence, a critical component of the first rule of law dimension.
III. Judicial Independence Measures

Conceptual Matters
Like the general literature on the rule of law, conceptual differences characterize the literature on judicial independence (Burbank and Friedman 2002; Russell and O'Brien 2001) 5 . Still, we can distinguish between two general ways in which scholars use the term. The first concept of independence demands that judges be the "authors of their own opinions" (Kornhauser 2002, 42-55) . On this account, a judge is independent when she does not face undue external or internal pressure (as say from hierarchical superiors) to resolve cases in particular ways. 6 In other words, a judge is independent when the output of judicial processes reflects sincere judicial preferences (Becker 1970, 1-8) . Judicial independence in this sense is judicial autonomy. What judges think is what they produce.
A second concept of judicial independence takes into account a fundamental problem of judicial policy making. As the 78 th Federalist reminds us, lacking financial or physical means of coercion, courts depend on the assistance of other political authorities to enforce their decisions (Madison et al 1961) .
Under this second concept, the argument is that it makes little sense to call a judge independent if her decisions are routinely ignored or poorly implemented. Judicial independence requires not only that 5 There may be subtle but important differences regarding independence concepts depending on to whom independence refers (for example, the highest court, a court, a judge, the entire judiciary) and independence from whom (for example, other political branches, superior in the judicial hierarchy, parts in a trial). In this paper, however, we focus on the broader conceptual ideas. 6 Of course, political authorities always apply some pressure when they are parties to a case or when they file briefs as interested parties (e.g. amicus curiae briefs and other similar institutions). The key here is that this pressure is perfectly acceptable within the rules of the legal system. judges resolve cases in ways that reflect their sincere preferences, but also that their decisions are enforced in practice (Cameron 2002; Larkins 1996) . The latter deals with formal rules that are designed to insulate judges from undue pressure, either from outside the judiciary or from within. In our view, it is probably misleading to distinguish, at the conceptual level at least, between de facto and de jure "judicial independence." Judicial independence is best thought of as either autonomy or power, whereas institutions like fixed tenure, budgetary autonomy, and judicial councils are best thought of as rules designed to promote autonomy or power. They do not, strictly speaking, reflect judicial independence any more than, say, single-member district plurality voting rules reflect disproportionate political representation or any more than multiple veto players reflect political stability. It is certainly possible that rules of judicial insulation enhance judicial independence, but these are theoretical relationships between distinct concepts that need to be clearly established and tested. It seems conceptually preferable to call these rules what they are: institutions of judicial insulation.
That said, since the literature persists in calling rules of insulation de jure judicial independence, we will do so the same here.
Up to this point, we have addressed three types of judicial independence concepts. Before proceeding, however, we wish to consider how our measurement strategies might address the behavioral implications of strategic models of judicial decision-making. This is useful, we think, whether one adopts an autonomy or power concept of judicial independence. Simmons (2007, 22) , writing about the advantage of litigation strategies to advance human rights norms, provides a representative of the kind of behavior we have in mind. She writes:
One of the most important conditions for litigation to be a potentially useful strategy to enforce rights is judicial independence. For courts to play an important enforcement role, they must be at least somewhat independent from political control. The government or one of its agencies, representatives or allies is likely to be the defendant in rights cases, and unless local courts have the necessary insulation from politics, they are unlikely to agree to hear and even less likely to rule against their political benefactors. Anticipating futility, individuals or groups may decide to avoid the courts altogether.
The kind of strategic judicial deference alluded to here is anticipated by common models of judicial-government interaction, and has received considerable empirical support in studies around the globe (Ginsburg 2003; Helmke 2005; Herron and Randazzo 2003) . Strikingly, scholars have even uncovered strategic effects on courts generally thought to be highly independent, like the United States Supreme Court and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (Martin 2006; Vanberg 2005) . If these models are correct, then non-systematic observation of judicial decision-making, litigation strategies and compliance as a means of developing measures of independence can be significantly misleading. Indeed, a court that offers little constraint on government can appear to be highly constraining if it chooses its cases wisely. It certainly can ensure systematic compliance, which makes inferring judicial power from the outcomes of legal conflicts difficult. For this reason, it will be useful to consider how our measures might deal with strategic judicial behavior. We return to this issue below.
Content Validity Analysis
We have identified thirteen measures that social scientists have used in empirical research. Table   2 partitions the measures into categories of de jure and de facto independence and indicates the years for which they are available. Further, within the category of de facto independence, we have indicated (whenever it is clear) whether the researchers responsible for the measure intended to capture an autonomy or power concept. Our appendix contains detailed information on the construction of the measures summarized in Table 2 . As is clear from the table, far more measures aim at de facto independence than de jure independence, and within the former category, scholars largely seem to have targeted the power concept.
[ Table 2 ]
A systematic account of content validity would require a thorough evaluation of the extent to which each measure reflects the theoretical concept of interest. Ultimately, this is a subjective exercise, as there is always something to quarrel with when considering the content of particular measures, especially so when concepts are contested and subject to strategic behavior. Rather than provide a systematic account of the content validity of each measure, we wish to provide some representative examples, highlight a few curious choices, and finally suggest how measures might address the strategic behavior problem. The appendix provides the information necessary for a reader to evaluate content independently. which is derived from United States State Department country reports, is a three-category ordinal measure, which indicates whether the high court of a state in a particular year is fully independent, partially independent or dependent. According to Howard and Carey (2004, 287-88) , a state has a fully independent judiciary if the high court functions in practice:
• [Independently] of the executive and legislature, and is
• Relatively free from corruption and bribery and provides basic criminal due process protections to criminal defendants.
A state has a partially independent judiciary if its high court either satisfies the first or the second condition or partially satisfies both. A state has a dependent judiciary if its high court satisfies neither condition.
In general, the measure is reasonably well connected to the concept. That said, Tate and Keith (2007) question whether Howard and Carey's focus on criminal due process rules moves the measure away from standard concepts of judicial independence. If Howard and Carey have the autonomy concept in mind, then this concern is certainly apt. It is quite possible for a court to be the "author of its own opinions" even if it provides little due process protections for criminal defendants. Indeed, the court under analysis could be fully responsible for eliminating such protections through its doctrinal choices. And it is certainly possible that in some states, the legal infrastructure necessary to advance the kind of actions necessary to liberalize criminal due process doctrine does not exist. If this is true, then no matter how independent a court is, and no matter how much it might like to extend the rights of the criminally accused, it simply will not be confronted with the cases useful to making such a rights revolution (Epp 1998). In such cases, the Howard and Carey measure will be biased toward dependence.
Henisz (2000) provides a representative example of a power, de facto independent measure.
Henisz wishes to measure the extent to which a state's judiciary serves as a constraint on government. To that end, the Henisz measure incorporates information from two other indicators of the power, de facto independence concept: the Polity Executive Constraints (Polity) measure and the Political Risk Service's Law and Order (PRS) measure. The Polity measure indicates the extent to which a state's chief executive faces constraints on its decision-making process. According to the Polity authors, one (but not the only) constraint on this authority is an independent judiciary. The PRS measure combines a law component, intended to measure the "strength and impartiality of the legal system," with an order component, intended to measure popular observance of formal legal rules. The Henisz indicator assigns a score of 1 to states that are coded sufficiently high on both the Polity and PRS measures, and a 0 otherwise (see appendix for coding rules). The key content validity concern here is that the Henisz measure includes elements of alternative dimensions of the rule of law. Popular observance of law is not well connected to the institutional constraint dimension. That said, the logic of the Henisz measure is that on average, combing the ICRG and Polity measures should reflect de facto independence better than either the Polity or ICRG measure does on their own. There is no evidence that this is true. In the case of military jurisdiction, Keith also includes a code of -1 in the event that a constitution explicitly endorses military jurisdiction. Apodaca (2004) creates an additive index of these seven items, whose range is from -1 to 14. Tate and Keith (2007, 23) have questioned the validity of such a scale, noting that at least two factors reflect the underlying dimension over which these measures vary.
Hybrid Measures and Partial Judicial Independence
Although we found evidence that the de facto measures seem reasonably well targeted at de facto concepts, it is not uncommon for these measures to include institutional components, as well. Howard and Carey (2004) and Tate and Keith (2007) • It has the right to rule on the constitutionality of legislative acts and executive decrees.
• Judges at the highest level of courts have a minimum of seven-year tenure.
• The President or Minister of Justice cannot directly appoint or remove judges and the removal of judges is restricted (e.g. allowed for criminal misconduct).
• Actions of the executive and legislative branch can be challenged in the courts.
• All court hearings are public.
• Judgeships are held by professionals.
Notice that these criteria all provide de jure information. Although the distinction between partial and no judicial independence seems to be based on de facto criteria, Cingranelli and Richards reserve the highest category for states that satisfy this set of formal rules. It is not clear why. In addition, event though de jure indicators are included there is no consideration of the theoretical relations between them.
For instance, appointment procedures and length of tenure may be related. If the president directly appoints judges but they hold their positions for life, should they be considered less independent than judges that are appointed through non-political means but have short tenure periods? Or, take the case of the possibility that the judiciary has the power of constitutional adjudication: If access to constitutional justice is severely restricted, should one count this de jure capability towards more independence?
Judicial Strategy
Once we recognize that judicial decision-making is strategic (e.g. (1999) . The CIM is "the ratio of noncurrency money to the total money supply" (Clague et al. 1999, 188) . Conceptually, high values of CIM reflect a society's trust in judicial institutions that enforce the banking industry's contractual obligations.
To be sure, the CIM was conceptualized as a measure of legal protections for property rights, and this is how it has been traditionally used in the literature (e.g. Clague et al. 1999, 186; Souva, Smith, and Rowan 2008) . In order to use it as a general measure of de facto independence, we must assume that, on average, states that possess judicial institutions that protect property rights are likely to have judicial institutions that protect rights generally. There are good reasons to believe that CIM is a valid measure of the extant to which courts protect rights generally, including human rights. In particular, simple predictive validity tests indicate that the CIM is negatively associated with a variety of state human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and disappearances and it is correlated with other measures of the concept (Powell and Staton 2009) . It is even associated with decisions of a state to adopt without reservation the international Convention Against Torture (Powell and Staton 2009) . Importantly, this measure should not be sensitive to the kind of strategic judicial decision making discussed above, because it does not directly reflect case decisions or compliance, but rather picks up the behavior we should observe from individuals if courts constitute constraints on the state. On the other hand, it is obvious that the CIM can certainly be conceptualized as a direct measure of confidence in banking, and so if a research question requires that we distinguish between, say, confidence in banking rules and courts, then obviously, the CIM will be problematic. Nevertheless, even in such a situation, the challenge will again be to address the problem of strategic behavior in whatever measure is adopted. In our view, a pragmatic approach is useful here. The CIM or some other measure based on the behavioral consequences of a de facto independent judiciary, may be extremely helpful in a particular research context -in others, it may simply not make sense.
Convergent Validity Analysis
Convergent validation considers whether different measures of similar concepts are related to one another (Adcock and Collier 2001, 540) . Ideally, we would like a benchmark measure of judicial independence against which we can simultaneously compare our measures. Of course, in the judicial independence literature there really is nothing close to a benchmark. That said, we can evaluate the extent to which measures are associated with each other. A quick glance at four states raises some flags. Henisz scores are low, whereas the PRS returns a middling value. These results are troubling, and we will return to them below. However, at this stage we will merely note that they are impressionistic and turn to a more systematic examination.
[ Table 3 ] (Martin et al) , and that the institutions of judicial insulation that are placed in the constitution have a stronger impact than those placed in the organic laws of the judiciary depending on the rigidity of the constitution and the partisan composition of the organs necessary to make constitutional amendments (Pozas-Loyo and Ríos-Figueroa 2006).
Construct Validity Analysis
Construct validation involves considering whether measures of a concept are related to measures of alternative concepts in ways that are anticipated by theoretical models (Adcock and Collier 2001, 537) .
In this section, we consider two types of construct validity tests.
Human Rights
Scholars have found considerable evidence linking judicial independence to a state's protection of human rights -the physical integrity of the person in particular (Cross 1999; Blasi and Cingranelli 1996; Keith 2002; Powell and Staton 2009 focus on a handful of institutions of judicial insulation, and it may be the case that measures based on an extended and careful coding of a more complete set of de jure institutions correlates better with human rights outcomes.
[ Table 5 ]
European Settler Mortality Rates
We provide one last construct validity test, leveraging an instrument for "good institutions," developed by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, AJR) . AJR set out to address a plausible endogeneity concern in rule of law models of economic development. It is hard to believe that quality legal institutions cause economic development but are not impacted themselves by development.
Causality almost certainly runs in both directions. Consequently, a typical model of development that includes a legal institutional variable on the right hand side is likely to produce a biased estimate of institutional effects, in part capturing the effect of development on institutions. AJR instrument for these institutions with a measure of colonial settler mortality rates in the 19 th century. The logic behind the instrument is that where Europeans faced environments that were relatively disease-free and generally hospitable, they built institutions that reflected those at home anticipating significant migration. These institutions were designed to protect rights. However, where they faced relatively inhospitable environments, European states did not construct such institutions as they did not anticipate significant migration. These initial choices locked in differences in institutional quality over time. Table 6 summarizes the results of twelve regression models. We regressed the log of the AJR settler mortality rate on the same measures used in Table 5 . We estimated ordered logit models for the three State Department-based measures, a logit model for the Henisz measure and the ordinary least squares for the remaining measures. As the table indicates, all of the de facto independence coefficients are negatively signed and statistically significant, an important result given the small sample size.
Reflecting the general pattern of results so far, although each of the de jure measures is negatively signed, only the Feld and Voigt score is statistically significant. As before, the results are stronger for the de facto measures.
[ Table 6 ] produces a judicial independence measure that is missing systematically. Indeed, the BTI should produce a non-random pattern of missingness by design. If there is significant evidence of non-random missingness across our measures, and scholars do not address it (and we have no evidence that researchers do), then it is likely that all estimates of judicial independence effects are subject to the biases associated with various haphazard strategies of imputation (King et al 2001) . How serious is this problem for the measures generally? It turns out that it is quite serious.
Patterns of Missingness
There are many possible patterns of non-random missingness. We test about the simplest theory of missingness that we could construct, suggesting that missingness can be explained by a state's level of economic development. We anticipate that the average GDP per capita of states with missing data for judicial independence should be lower than the average where the data is not missing. Table 7 shows difference of means tests for economic development, as measured by GDP/capita in constant US dollars in the year 2000 and its natural log. As is clear, there is evidence of non-random missingness for every judicial independence measure except the Howard and Carey measure and the differences are substantial in some cases. For the Fraser measure, average income is $9856 where the data is not missing yet plummets to $2433 where the data is missing. Moreover, although nearly every measure exhibits a missingness pattern where we are more likely to observe a score for wealthier states, the Take & Keith measure resembles the BTI score in that it is more likely to be missing for rich states! [ Table 7 ]
In one sense, it is perhaps not critical to note this non-random pattern of missing data. This is a feature of all kinds of data, and scholars generally have a responsibility to deal with it as it emerges. That said, it is important to stress that scholars in this field are not dealing with it, so that it is unclear what to make of our empirical inferences. Further, if you pair the missing data problem with a problem that emerged above in the convergent validity analysis, we have a very serious problem on our hands.
Recall from Table 3 that our selected measures seemed to perform similarly for Germany and Denmark but not for Mexico and Pakistan. Is it possible that the measures are more likely to agree for better developed states than underdeveloped states? Table 8 suggests that they are. This table shows correlation coefficients between the Take & Keith measure and all of the other de facto measures used in the construct validity tests, divided by whether states fall above or below the median GDP/capita level for our entire dataset (US$1550). That pattern is striking. For every measure, the correlation is considerably stronger for above the median than it is below. Indeed, for the Feld & Voigt measure, the correlation is actually negative below the median and positive above! Providing this information for all measures is cumbersome, but the results generalize. The de facto measures are more strongly related among developed states than they are among underdeveloped states.
Does this matter? Consider two empirical facts. First, judicial independence data is missing systematically by level of development. Second, the measures themselves are move likely to agree among the move developed states. One central recommendation of Haggard et al is to run robustness checks on models that use rule of law data. While we agree with this suggestion in principle, if we do this without dealing with the missing data problem, we bias ourselves toward confirming our inferences. The reason is that we will be more likely to be conducting our robustness checks on more developed states, as these are the states for which we are more likely to have data; and, these are also the states where out measures are more likely to agree. Applied researchers simply must address the missing data problem in this context.
Summary
First, although the various judicial independence measures do not share content perfectly, there is evidence that they are all aiming at one of two well-known independence concepts -autonomy and power. We also find reasonable evidence in a variety of contexts for the convergent and construct validity of a wide array of de facto judicial independence measures. These measures seem to be picking up reasonably an underlying concept of independence. That said, these measures are not always strongly correlated and conceptually it is not clear that they all address strategic behavior. We provided one example of a measure that can address this problem, the CIM. For this reason, a reasonable conclusion is that since there is decent evidence for the validity of these measures generally, scholars should choose the indicators that satisfy their theoretical goals.
Second, we find that de jure and de facto measures of judicial independence do not covary. If we think that they are tapping into different concepts, the low correlations are a positive result from a measurement validity perspective. On the other hand, if we have theoretical reasons to believe that they are related, this finding calls for a refinement of two issues of research. In one sense, there is a measurement issue. Perhaps we require de jure measures that are better targeted at the broad set of incentives that judges face rather than a few institutional rules like tenure and appointment. But we think the result calls for better theoretical models, which identify more precisely which and how institutions for judicial insulation produce judicial independence.
Finally, we stress that scholars must seriously consider the non-random patterns of missingness in their data, especially in this context. Robustness analysis, which should provide us all with greater confidence in the arguments we produce, is no simple fix here. Indeed, simply substituting one judicial independence measure for another and considering whether results "hold up" is biased toward finding that they do.
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Conclusion
The concept of rule of law is now regularly found in arguments about its importance to life in peaceful, free, and prosperous societies. Yet the lack of a standard definition should make us cautious about the several measures that measure it. We argued that the rule of law concept in its broadest sense is simply too big for the vast majority of research projects, and that a broad definition impedes the theoretical and empirical assessment of causal relations between its different dimensions and components.
Focusing on judicial independence, a crucial component or the rule of law, is a step ahead in using 12 Of course, we would be remiss if we did not address the obvious tension in our conclusions. We have not addressed it ourselves in this working paper, our strategy for dealing with missingness in our validity tests (i.e. listwise deletion) is far from adequate, and raises questions about the uncertainty we need to have about our validity analysis. We intend to address this problem in a subsequent version. At this point, we simply note that we should approach the results with an appropriate degree of skepticism.
narrower concepts but, still, how do we choose amongst different measures of judicial independence? We argued that theory should be the guide in making this choice. Distinguishing between three concepts of judicial independence we evaluate the validity of thirteen measures that have been used in the literature and find reasonable evidence in a variety of contexts for the convergent and construct validity of a wide array of de facto judicial independence measures. In contrast, de jure measures do not converge and we think this finding poses interesting questions for future versions of the paper. For instance, should we aim at coding the broad set of incentives that judges face rather than a few institutional rules like tenure and appointment? Under what conditions de jure institutions for judicial insulation have an effect on de facto measures of judicial behavior? Or is it that the case that formal institutions of judicial insulation are not necessarily related to actual judicial independence?
We also find interesting non-random patterns of missing data across all measures. Although it is clear that data availability varies wildly across measures, what is less well understood is that the missing data problem is broader and more consequential than that measures simply return no information on some states in some years. Missingness is related to levels of development and this coupled with convergence of de facto measures of judicial independence call into question the adequacy of robustness analysis. We of course recognize that the non-random missingness, and the challenge to inference that it implies, also means that the validity analysis carried out in this paper should be taken with a grain of salt. In future versions of the project we plan to derive multiple imputation estimates of the parameters and re-do the validity tests.
Appendix: Brief descriptions of measures included in the analysis
Political Risk Services (PRS) "Law & Order" measure
The Law and Order measure is part of the Political Risk Rating that includes 12 components and 15 subcomponents covering both political and social attributes. The PRS staff collects political information and financial and economic data, converting these into risk points for each individual risk component. The political risk assessments are made on the basis of subjective analysis of the available information. In the "Law and Order" component, Law and Order are assessed separately; each component can take values from 0 to 3 to a total of 6 joint points together. The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating -3 -in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating -1 -if it suffers from a very high crime rate of if the law is routinely ignored without effective sanction (for example, widespread illegal strikes). As noted in the POLITY II Codebook (Gurr 1990 ):
"Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups." In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful; advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. A seven-category scale is used (for examples on evidence used to code countries, see Gurr 1990) .
See: http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~whmoore/polity/polity.html Fraser Institute's measure of "Legal structure and security of property rights"
The annual Economic Freedom of the World Report uses 42 distinct pieces of data to measure economic freedom in 141 nations. The index measures the degree to which the policies and institutions of countries support economic freedom. According to the Fraser Institute, the cornerstones of economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to compete, and security of privately owned property. They measure five broad areas: (1) size of government; (2) legal structure and security of property rights; (3) access to sound money; (4) freedom to trade internationally; and (5) regulation of credit, labor and business. Each component and sub-component is placed on a scale from 0 to 10. The sub-component ratings are averaged to determine each component; the component ratings within each area are averaged to derive ratings for each of the five areas; in turn, the summary rating is the average of the five area ratings.
The area of "Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights" considers that protection of persons and their rightfully acquired property is a central element of both economic freedom and a civil society. According to the Fraser Institute, the key ingredients of a legal system consistent with economic freedom are: rule of law, security of property rights, an independent judiciary, and an impartial court system. Indicators for this area are assembled from three primary sources: the Political Risk Services (PRS, data generated by staff of the company), the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR, data generated by a survey of firms operating in a given country), and the World Bank's Doing Business data set (DB, data generated by a survey or businessmen).
See: http://www.freetheworld.com/
La Porta et al (2003) measure "Judicial Checks and Balances"
La Porta and his coauthors measure judicial independence and constitutional review. "Judicial independence is of obvious value for securing property and political rights when the government is itself a litigant, as in the takings of property by the state. But judicial independence is also socially valuable in purely private disputes when one of the litigants is politically connected, and the executive wants the court to favor its ally." (2003, 3) "Besides seeking to influence judges, the executive and the legislature would also wish to pursue policies and pass laws that benefit themselves, or democratic majorities, or allied interest groups. Constitutional review is intended to limit these powers. By checking laws against a rigid constitution, a court can limit such self-serving efforts." (2003, 4) Their measure of "judicial checks and balances" comes from national constitutions, including all 71 countries covered in the Maddex (1995) Encyclopedia of Constitutions, with the exception of transition economies because "their constitutions are rapidly changing". Judicial independence is proxied by looking at the tenure of judges in the highest ordinary court, the tenure of judges in the highest administrative court, and to whether courts have "law making" powers and judicial decisions are constrained by prior judicial decisions. Constitutional review is measured by the degree of rigidity of the constitution, and the extent of judicial review powers.
Feld and Voigt's (2003) measure of De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence
Feld & Voigt measure judicial independence de jure and judicial independence de facto. They focus on the independence of the court with authority to interpret the constitution.
The authors sent a questionnaire to experts (judges, law professors, lawyers, activists of NGOs) asking several quite detailed questions regarding the different components of both of their concepts. The components of judicial independence de jure are (1) whether the highest court is anchored in the constitution; (2) how difficult is to amend the constitution, (3) appointment procedure of judges; (4) their length of tenure, (5) whether there is a fixed retirement age of judges in the court; (6) removal procedures; (7) whether reelection of judges is possible; (8) protection and adequacy of salary of judges; (9) accessibility to the highest court; (10) procedure for allocation of cases in the court; (11) judicial review powers; and (12) transparency of the court.
The components of judicial independence de facto are: (1) average length of tenure; (2) deviation of average length of tenure from de jure prescription; (3) number of judges removed from office; (4) frequency of changes in the number of judges in the court; (5) real salary of judges; (6) real court's budget; (7) number of constitutional changes in relevant articles; and (8) compliance by other branches on court rulings.
Cingranelli & Richards (2008)
Cingranelli and Richards develop their measure of judicial independence from the United States State Department yearly country reports. Their concept of judicial independence requires that judges be free from control by the government or military. In particular, Cingranelli and Richards ask whether judges can be removed from office, whether there is judicial review, whether judges are free from corruption and whether case outcomes are not influenced by the government. While the dimensions of judicial independence conceptualized by each of these scholars and others do not fit together perfectly, we do see a common core across them that allows us to identify two somewhat overlapping sets of distinctions. The first is the distinction between (1) institutional (or collective) independence from the other branches or private and public actors and (2) the independence of the individual judge from the same influences.
Following the Howard and Carey approach, Tate and Keith code states as follows. States receive a 2 if "the judiciary is reported as "generally independent" or is independent in practice with no mention of corruption or outside influence," 1 if "the judiciary is reported to be somewhat independent in practice with reports of (some) pressure from the executive "at times" or with occasional reports of corruption," and 0 if "the judiciary is reported as not being independent in practice; is reported to have significant or high levels of executive influence or interference; or is reported to high levels of corruption. (17) An independent judiciary refers fi rst and foremost to how far the courts can interpret and review norms and pursue their own reasoning free from the infl uence of rulers or powerful groups and individuals. This requires a differentiated organization of the legal system, including legal education, jurisprudence, regulated appointment of the judiciary, rational proceedings, professionalism, channels of appeal and court administration.
The BTI judicial independence measure is a scale from 1 (low) to 10 (high). Experts consider whether
The judiciary is free both from unconstitutional intervention by other institutions and from corruption. Note: All measures are normalized to one that corresponds to the highest degree of "rule of law" or "judicial independence". Apodaca (2004) . The only change across the models involves substituting in a new judicial independence measure. All but one coefficient is negative across the models and all but the de facto Feld & Voigt measure reaches statistical significance. Full results are available upon request. 
